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When Santha Rama Rau burst onto the international literary scene in 1945 with 
her first book, Home to India, she was just twenty-two years old. Over half a dozen 
books and half a century later, she was anthologized in a Norton reader as a writer, a 
writing teacher, and the prototypical cosmopolitan of the twentieth century: “Born 
in Madras, India . . . [she] lived all over the world, from England to South Africa 
to Japan, until she settled in the United States.”1 Rama Rau’s transformation from 
fledgling author into the embodiment of the modern cosmopolitan ideal was largely 
a function of her elite status, her family connections, and the opportunities avail-
able to her as an educated Indian woman. The daughter of a diplomat father and 
an activist-feminist mother, she had all the credentials of the classic cosmopolite, 
including a transnational childhood lived across the spaces of the British Raj and an 
equally mobile adulthood facilitated by marriage to an American, Faubion Bowers, 
and a career as a travel writer. Though she did not recognize herself as exceptional, 
she conceded that her contemporaries might find her life “odd, peculiar, even a 
little mad . . . or exotic.”2 Exoticism was, of course, a fate to which many ex-colonial 
people who aspired to a cosmopolitan identity were subject in the decades following 
the breakup of the British Empire. But Rama Rau’s story does more than reveal the 
possibilities and limits of cosmopolitanism. Taken together, the books she produced 
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in the wake of her travels in the 1940s and 1950s articulate a shifting vision of global 
community: from an earlier, Eurocentric model — rooted in a British/imperial world-
view — to a pan-Asian model — rooted in the realization of an emergent America- 
centered global hegemony. Like most if not all women’s travel writing, Rama Rau’s 
work demonstrates how the sentimental journey of development articulated in the 
travelogue helps to shape a gendered narrative of political education — in this case, 
that of a privileged Indian woman in a newly postcolonial world. It also enables us 
to see with particular vividness the intersection of a historically specific form of cos-
mopolitanism with the realities of the late-twentieth-century world order as sym-
bolized by the 1955 conference in Bandung — and to appreciate the role of India, 
and Indians, as sites of translation between one anglophone empire (Britain) and 
another (the United States).
And yet in suggesting this I do not wish to reclaim formerly Eurocentric ver-
sions of cosmopolitanism as postcolonial Indian property (“natives” can be cosmo-
politan too). What is historically significant and politically consequential about Rama 
Rau’s work is that her performance of cosmopolitanism — its riff on the Kantian 
ideal of universalist, worldly disinterest — was the enactment of a very particular, 
highly contingent promontory perspective on both Asia and the decolonizing world 
more generally.3 An inheritance of both British colonialism and Indian national-
ism, Rama Rau’s cosmopolitanism was also the effect of her desire to be seen as an 
extranational Indian expert in first decades of the Cold War. As we shall see, Rama 
Rau was above all an uneasy cosmopolitan, in part because she came to realize 
that a peculiar brand of orientalism animated her aspiring cosmopolitan visions — a 
phenomenon she recognized with surprise, puzzlement, regret and, finally, a very 
publicly staged political transformation. In the process, she mapped the progress 
of her particular postcolonial education for the benefit of postwar readers in Brit-
ain and the United States especially: readers who had a growing appetite for what 
Christina Klein has called “cold war orientalism.”4 Equally provocative is the point-
edly gendered dis-ease Rama Rau experienced as she tried to negotiate the shifting 
role of “India for Indians” at once within the parameters of the cosmopolitanism 
she had inherited from a pre-postcolonial world and against the backdrop of a pan-
Asianism with which she felt a deep and unanticipated sympathy. Nor, as we shall 
see, did the so-called new world of Asia represent the territorial limit of her Cold 
War cosmopolitanism. She viewed Africa, through the lens of Kenya’s Mau Mau, 
as an object lesson in the challenges of managing insurgent nationalism and “the 
race question” in the years leading up to the Bandung Conference. Reading Rama 
Rau as one instance of an emergent and uneasy cosmopolitan allows us to begin to 
historicize the cultural politics of nationalism in the age of Bandung. Rather than 
fetishizing the conference as an unequivocally liberatory or even inaugural event, 
made possible by the demise of European empires and the emergence of avowedly 
nonaligned postcolonial leaders on the world stage, we need to appreciate Bandung, 
150    Radical History Review 
Burton | Cold War Cosmopolitanism    151 
its immediate prehistory, and its aftermath as an extended historical moment dur-
ing which a set of “semi-imperialisms” (India over Japan, India over Africa, India as 
prima inter pares in Asia) also emerged.5 These semi-imperialisms were animated 
by postwar realignments, by the colonial legacies that helped to shape the ideologi-
cal character and the political culture of new states (India prime among them), and 
by the exigencies of that quintessential Cold War figure, the postcolonial expert.6
Rama Rau’s diasporic childhood and adolescence set the stage for the kind of 
Cold War cosmopolitan she became. Her father, Sir Benegal Rama Rau, had been 
financial advisor to the Simon Commission and, later, secretary to the Roundtable 
Conference. As a result, the family lived in England for much of the 1930s, with 
the two Rama Rau children, Premila and Santha, attending a Quaker school in Sur-
rey as boarders, and in South Africa, which is where they were when World War 
II broke out. Rama Rau’s mother, Dhanvanthi Rama Rau, was a prominent social 
reformer with a special interest in family planning. A past president of the annual 
All-India Women’s Conference (AIWC), she had a reputation as a firebrand, not 
least for her willingness to stand up to British feminists of the period over issues like 
child marriage and purdah in the interwar years.7 The Rama Raus were Nehruvi-
ans, in deed as well as word: Santha’s father served the postcolonial Indian state as 
the first Indian ambassador to Tokyo and then to Washington, DC, career moves 
that were to shape his daughter’s apprehensions of the global arena in life-changing 
ways. Her mother, for her part, was a staunch defender of the Nehruvian vision, 
with its secular commitments and its developmentalist agenda of social progress.8 
But she eschewed the companionate marriage model that had undergirded Indian 
nationalism (at least of the Congress variety) since the nineteenth century, refus-
ing to accompany her husband on his diplomatic mission to Tokyo, for example, in 
order to carry on her work with the AIWC on the eve of independence.9 Limits of 
space do not permit me to give more than this cursory background, but suffice it to 
say that Santha Rama Rau’s privileged childhood predisposed her to appreciate the 
connections between cosmopolitanism travel and politics — and especially between 
Indian nationalism and transnational mobility.
Santha Rama Rau’s first book, Home to India (1945), not only announced her 
arrival on the literary scene, it also established her credentials as a cosmopolitan 
traveler on the very threshold of a postcolonial India. As she framed it, at least at the 
start of the narrative, such cosmopolitanism depended on an identification with and 
an allegiance to Britain and things British for its vision and its cachet — articulated 
here through the idiom of orientalism. Set in 1939, the book chronicles Rama Rau’s 
return to her grandmother’s house in Bombay, and to India more generally, for the 
first time in nearly a decade. Though born in India, Rama Rau sees herself as a 
foreigner in her own land — someone who is “homesick for London” and recognizes 
India in a vague sort of way from “Hollywood’s Orients.”10 Drawing on a twentieth- 
century practice among elite women writers of conjuring domestic space as the 
nation, Rama Rau stages her grandmother’s home as all of India.11 Thus the Colaba 
house emerges from the very first pages of the book as a space whose interiors rep-
resent local tradition, even as they open onto the entire subcontinent — all of which 
Rama Rau can experience simply by walking “across the deep veranda in to the cool 
twilight of the house.”12 Rama Rau performs her discovery of India experiences as a 
coming- of-age travel narrative in which growing up entails coming to terms with her 
Indian-but-not-quite identity. In the first instance, she positions herself as a tourist 
in her grandmother’s home. As such she is appalled by pigeons in the bedroom, 
surprised by the presence of a radio in the drawing room, and bemused by her 
grandmother’s determination to reconcile her to her destiny as a proper, high-caste 
Indian woman. Both Santha and her sister Premila see themselves as explorers, at 
least of a certain privileged landscape: yacht clubs and the Taj Mahal Hotel figure 
prominently, though they do also take the train to Delhi to experience the winter 
“social season” (68 – 73). Their promontory perspective on home and India produces 
both as tourist sights: “out of the way places” that require them to “rough it” and 
above all to be schooled in their own national identity — as chapter 2, “On Learning 
to Be an Indian,” suggests (14 – 21).
Home to India tracks Rama Rau’s educational development by mapping it 
onto a travelogue of India that moves gradually outward from the house at Colaba 
to New Delhi society and, eventually, into the heart of nationalist political circles. 
What follows retains the character of an orientalist ethnography with very specific 
pedagogical purposes. Santha and Premila venture into the bazaar, for example, to 
see how much a pice will purchase: “It seemed to us incredible that one could buy 
anything at all for half a penny, but apparently millions of people were doing it” (57). 
Their trips to Kashmir and Tibet have the same kind of “slumming it” cast to them, 
all the more so because Rama Rau continues to frame her account in the language 
of curiosity, tourism, and discovery and to differentiate herself and her sister from 
“real Indians.” The fact that the Kashmir trip brings them into contact with photog-
raphers from Life magazine reinforces the touristic quality of the narrative. When 
a group of Tibetans rejects the peaches the photographer offered them but keeps 
the tin they came in, Rama Rau remarks, “the people we met along the way were a 
constant source of diversion” (84).
Such comments are typical of how Rama Rau dramatizes her return from 
exile and her attempts to negotiate the relationship between her elite status and a 
certain kind of cosmopolitan/nationalist politics in situ. At the same time, as Home 
to India progresses, she represents herself as increasingly invested in critiquing 
Western visitors and registering her dissatisfaction with British imperial views about 
India. Although this critique produces a more knowledgeable and sympathetic view 
of Indian nationalism, the long-term effect of Rama Rau’s political education is not 
an embrace of India, but a geographical reorientation of a different order. As Home 
to India draws to a close, Britain is eclipsed as the source of culture, knowledge, and 
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possibility — to be replaced by America, which, as Rama Rau recalls, “seemed to all 
of us a remote and wonderful land: freedom, education, democracy for everyone” 
(65). Although the reasons for her decision to go to college in the United States (she 
opts for Wellesley from among the list of Seven Sisters) are never fully addressed, 
the choice is nonetheless significant. It signals a break not just with Raj traditions 
but with certain elite Indian nationalist ones as well: rather than being “England-
returned,” Rama Rau will be “America-returned” instead. Ending up in the United 
States rather than Britain for her education, political and otherwise, also makes for 
a dramatic break with the Anglo-Indian world of her parents, revealing the bildung-
sroman at the heart of Home to India in the process.13
Home to India launched Rama Rau’s career as a minor literary celebrity. 
It was critically acclaimed in the New York Times, and she was heralded as the 
embodiment of “East meets West.”14 If some of her success was derived from the 
self-consciously staged orientalist tack she took for narrating her discovery of India, 
her next book adopted an even more didactic approach to the question of a cosmo-
politan identity in a postcolonial world. East of Home (1950) finds her in full profes-
sional travel-writer mode as she journeys from Japan to China through Southeast 
Asia during tumultuous political times. It is shaped inexorably by the fact that she 
begins her tour in the midst of occupied Japan, where her father was the first Indian 
ambassador and she his official hostess during the 1950s. A career diplomat, Rama 
Rau senior took rather a dim view of his young daughter’s naïveté, and especially of 
her “shock” at seeing war-torn Tokyo for the first time. The extent to which Santha’s 
apprehensions of “the East” are set up, if not determined, by his diplomatic perspec-
tive may be gleaned from this anecdote, which opens the book:
My father, who feels less need to talk than anyone I know, made one of his rare 
comments. “Americans,” he said, “get homesick so easily.”
“And I suppose we don’t?” I said. “East is east, and . . .”
“It’s all very well,” he told me, “to be flippant about it, but you have only 
traveled in the West, and you know nothing about your own continent.
Here you now feel a foreigner to the Japanese; soon you will feel increasingly 
foreign to the Americans and Europeans.
After all,” he said unemphatically, “you belong to Asia, you know, not just 
India.”
“Yes,” I said, not believing him.15
East of Home is, in many ways, the fulfillment of this prophecy. At every turn in 
Japan, and indeed throughout her Asian travels, Rama Rau stages her experience as 
a series of confrontations between the realities of American power and the call to 
identify with “the Orient” as a transnational phenomenon.
Given the neo-imperial status of the American conquering force in Japan 
in 1947 and after, the former can hardly seem surprising. That Santha Rama Rau 
identified with the occupation forces appears somewhat more provocative. At one 
level, such an identification was perhaps inevitable, given her family’s nationalist 
connections and her father’s diplomatic status; this is especially so as the Diplo-
matic Corps in India was officially designated as “Occupation Personnel” in Tokyo 
in 1947, with all the privileges, both official and unofficial, that that entailed (265). 
Occupation personnel ate food flown in from the United States; they rode on the 
trains and had access to cars while the mobility of Japanese was severely curtailed 
by the expense of petrol and the general breakdown of the urban infrastructure. In 
her capacity as hostess for her father, Rama Rau socialized with General MacArthur 
and his wife when they were in Tokyo. Structurally at least, this gave Rama Rau a 
promontory perspective on the Japanese; the Japan in her account is thus a defeated 
imperial power but also an emerging colonial one by virtue of the American occupa-
tion. Rama Rau clearly understood this, though her critique was not of the Ameri-
can military presence, but rather of her father who, she claimed, “seemed relatively 
unimpressed by the curious Occupation dream world in which we saw the Japanese 
on the streets, requisitioned their houses, used their movies and clubs, but never 
met them” (4 – 5).
Elsewhere, Rama Rau’s narrative suggests her own take on the complex rela-
tionship of imperialism, colonialism, and the new world order as she encounters 
remnants of what is left of “high” Japanese culture in the immediate aftermath 
of war, defeat, and occupation. In the excerpt below, Rama Rau recounts a meet-
ing with the mother of a member of the Japanese reconstruction government, Mrs. 
Matsudaira:
The ground floor had one long room with a veranda opening onto the garden 
all along one side. Beyond that there was only a kitchen. The main room was 
divided into two with the usual light wooden Japanese partitions. It had tatami 
matting on the floor and parchment window panes.
The old lady began the conversation on a light diplomatic level, chatting in 
good, careful English about Europe and people.
Her husband, as ambassador for the old government of Japan, and she had 
traveled over most of Europe and America stationed first in London, later in 
Paris and still later in Washington.
Her daughters went to school in Cheltenham and were presented at Court, of 
which she made rather an amusing story about the difficulty of keeping ostrich 
feathers in the straight, heavy, Japanese hair.
I gathered that she and her family had been among the most powerful in 
prewar days, with several town and country houses and all the attendant 
luxury, but she made no reference to her change of circumstances. The whole 
conversation had a most unreal quality like a scene from one’s childhood. (16)
This lost cosmopolitan world of Japanese elites proves especially poignant for Rama 
Rau because of its resonances with her own family history. At the same time, it 
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allows her to construct Japan as the past: not primitive in any kind of organic way, 
but thrust into the past because it has been overtaken, both literally and figuratively, 
by a new world order, albeit one of an uncertain future. Her response is wonder-
ment, even pity; in what was perhaps an unconscious imitation of the classic Ameri-
can soldier’s gesture, after she leaves the Matsudairas, she sends her monthly ration 
of chocolate to the children (22).16
Despite the fact that the Japan that her father’s and future husband’s connec-
tions brings to her sight line is what shapes her initial encounter with the East, as in 
Home to India, Rama Rau represents her developing political education — and her 
growing expertise — as an effect of encounters with powerful women figures who 
compel her, with their own “insider” knowledge and frank political commitments, 
to admit her own ignorance and confront the complexity of perspectives that post-
colonial geopolitics brings into view. The first is Miss Hani, an instructor at the Jiyu 
Gakuyen (Freedom School where Rama Rau also does some teaching) and a propo-
nent of progressive, mixed (boys and girls) education. Hani’s mother laments how 
hard the project of coeducation is in a traditional culture and bemoans what little 
help they have in running the school because there are no servants available. “You 
are an Asian,” she tells Rama Rau, “so you will understand how strange that seems 
here.”17 Rama Rau’s account of her time in Japan is punctuated by recurrent refer-
ences to her “shared” Asian identity. When she tells Hani that she, too, aspires to 
be a teacher, Hani replies that “to an American I would speak about salary, but . . . 
we understand each other, and I would not insult you with such a discussion” (8). 
And when Hani asks Rama Rau to tell her about the West and the latter says she 
does not really know anything, “Miss Hani smiled as though she had expected just 
such Oriental humility from me” (9). As these experiences accumulate, Rama Rau 
reflects that “there is a curious solidarity between Asians of which I had never been 
conscious until I went to Japan, and here I began to notice it in my own attitude 
too” (30).
Significantly, Rama Rau’s own attitudes do not take shape without conflict, 
both direct and indirect. Indeed, the conflicts and the knowledge they produce for 
her about the East become the basis for her expertise in the realm of Cold War poli-
tics. Her father needles her about her Western presumptions and prejudices, and at 
least one student at the Jiyu Gakuyen challenges Rama Rau’s critique of Japanese 
imperialism, especially because of its “atrocities.” Those come in any war, the young 
female student responds.
“Well, the Allies did not go around beheading captured airmen,” I said on surer 
ground.
“Yes, those should be punished. But is it worse to behead a man than to shoot 
him or hang him or kill him with an atom bomb?”
“It seems barbaric to the West or rather,” I said, thinking of the far worse 
atrocities that the West has been guilty of, their concentration camps, 
and torture chambers, “to the democracies.” Then I amended that to “to 
Americans,” because of the atrocities of democratic countries in their Asian 
colonies. (24)
Here as elsewhere in East of Home, Rama Rau exceptionalizes the United States 
and sidesteps the relationship between the American occupation and imperialism 
tout court. She also displays the extent to which her claims to expertise are forged 
through encounters with Asian women who help her, by challenging her, to arrive at 
the kinds of postcolonial knowledge not generally available to American audiences. 
This is evident in her replay of her conversation with a Japanese woman journalist, 
Kumiko Nomura, who declares (on hearing of Gandhi’s death in 1948) that she loved 
the Mahatma because he fought for “freedom for Asia . . . that was what brought 
him close to our [Japanese] hearts” (67). Their exchange, as Rama Rau recorded it, 
is worth reviewing in full:
“Oh heavens!” I said, in final exasperation. “Wars and murder, conquests 
and concentration camps, people dead, and people wounded, and everybody 
poorer and the world unable to right itself for ages afterward — why do we all 
have to pretend that . . . it was for freedom or some such thing? Why can’t you, 
Kumiko, be honest and say it was for economic gain, or you had to, or from 
fear — ” 
“Almost all one’s actions are from fear, I think [Kumiko replied].
We were afraid of fighting, but other fears, stronger fears, made us fight. But 
you,” she said calmly and furiously, “an Indian, you should understand what 
we did. You, at last, have your freedom in your country, and you are the first 
nation in Asia to do that. But the rest of us? Are we not in chains? The Dutch, 
the French, the British rule Asia. In China, Americans try to build up their 
idea of a ‘good government’ with bullions and dollars. Siam is so small, and 
every western nation has a share in her government. And now we, the last to be 
subjugated, are a conquered nation too.  
Oh,” she said painfully and in despair, as though it was an old sore, “if only you 
had helped us. . . .”
“You should be thankful,” I said, sounding like a governess, “that you are 
occupied by the Americans. They are doing more to set your country on its feet 
than you could ever have done.”
“But,” she said, surprised into pleasantness, “that’s not what I was talking 
about, . . . I was talking about Asia and its freedoms. Look at the movements 
that have started now, since the war, in Indo-China, Indonesia, in Malaya and 
Burma, didn’t we organize them, arm them, lead them to ‘democracy’?
She put the world in verbal quote marks. “It was only possible for them — weak 
countries — to fight their conquerors after they had seen the white men beaten. 
Beaten by Asians, working for Asians — that was when their prestige vanished 
and the subject peoples had morale enough to revolt.
That is why you should have helped us. After the war,” she finished quietly, 
“ ‘the democracies’ returned those nations to their foreign rulers.
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Like all wars, it ends in mysteries. . . .”
She picked up her teacup. “Come, let us drink to Asia’s freedom.
It is what Mahatma Gandhi would have wanted, I am sure.” (68)
Although it somewhat conveniently overlooks Japan’s own experience as an impe-
rialist power, Nomura’s passionate discussion of Asian freedoms offers Rama Rau a 
history lesson — thus contributing to her ongoing political education and, not inci-
dentally, shoring up her own position as a cosmopolitan expert on the postcolonial 
scene by allowing her visibly to draw on the authentic voices and experiences of 
“natives.”
Beyond recounting the sheer drama of this geopolitical debate, Rama Rau 
stages a crucial moment in her postcolonial development here, one in which she 
comes face to face with her own prejudices, not least of which is her patronizing 
attitude toward Nomura (“ ‘You should be thankful,’ I said, sounding like a govern-
ess”). Rather than accepting the Japanese woman’s authority, Rama Rau responds 
to her provocations by organizing a pan-Asian trip, proposing to Bowers (to whom 
she was not yet married) and some of her friends that they tour Indochina, Thai-
land, Malaya, and Indonesia as well as China. This firsthand witness approach is 
crucial to the case for expert knowledge that Rama Rau builds throughout East 
of Home. Her account of this trip forms the bulk of the rest of the book, in which 
she effectively tries to work out “the problem” of the East for herself and for her 
readership — which is (as the Harper imprint indicates) largely an American one. 
Her literary mechanism for doing so is instructive: for after her heated discussion 
with Nomura, Rama Rau rarely takes up for the United States as she had done in 
the exchange above. Instead, she allows America, and American expertise, to be 
represented in the figure of her friend Clare Harris, the gendered equivalent of the 
ugly American who appears in East of Home almost a decade before the emergence 
of that term in the public sphere via William Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s 1958 
book of the same title.18
Though Rama Rau tells us that Harris is an American who works for the Pub-
lic Relations Office in occupied Japan and that she has been dispatched to research 
the “new Japanese woman,” we know little else about her personal details, except 
that she epitomizes that unabashed strain of Cold War orientalism personified by 
that would-be expert, the American journalist.19 Rama Rau tries taking Harris to 
Kabuki plays but the American has no interest, dismissing the performances as “feu-
dalism” and “perverted.” In China, Harris is shocked and disgusted by the “scenes 
of confusion and uninhibited atmosphere” of the city streets, where mock fights and 
obstreperous market bargaining are everywhere to be seen — not to mention dead 
bodies unattended to. “ ‘How appalling,’ Clare would say, or, ‘How callous — they 
just walk by.’ ”20 And their discussions with a Miss Wang over the lack of a West-
ern-style women’s movement make Harris indignant. When told that “the Chinese 
woman occupies a position of great serenity and dignity in her family,” Harris sits 
straight up and replies: “Do you mean that a Chinese woman looks forward to being 
no more than a wife and mother[?]” (75). Such scenes recur throughout their trip 
and give the narrative a dramatic edge it would not otherwise have had. The trope 
of the ugly American — in this case, the amateur who parodies American profes-
sional knowledge and expertise — is thus not just a straw figure but becomes critical 
to the pedagogical aims of the book as a whole. Harris’s sins are many, and they 
are highly gendered as well. Not only does she “shop European” everywhere she 
goes, but she provokes politically charged discussions with “natives” and her friends 
alike — a tendency which Rama Rau falls short of calling unbecoming, though her 
unease at Harris’s audacity is nonetheless clear. In Siam, Harris wants to know why 
the government collaborated with the Japanese. In Bali, she demands to have east-
ern marriage practices explained to her satisfaction and asks other more politically 
dangerous questions that her Balinese interlocutors try politely to parry. And at 
Angkor she insists on a conversation with Bowers motivated by her frustration that 
people they meet seem to think that America is always to blame. “It was the same in 
China, and now here,” she complains. “We’re wrong if we do send arms and wrong 
if we don’t. Why does everyone expect handouts from America?” (171).
Rama Rau occasionally intervenes in these discussions, as when she defends 
the dramatic violence of Kabuki as customary rather than simply backward-looking, 
commenting that she was “rather surprised to find myself arguing as an ‘Asian’ to 
a ‘Westerner’ ” (60). But for the most part, Rama Rau absents herself, representing 
the conversations in a realistic, as-they-happened mode — one in which she emerges 
as an observer, a student even, of the political lessons on offer. Most often, Harris 
is sparring with men in these exchanges, whether it is a local dignitary or Faubion 
Bowers — who often gets the last word. In response to Harris’s perceptions that 
America could do nothing right, Bowers replies (in what Rama Rau calls “a puzzled 
voice”): “Isn’t that strange, I was just thinking that we were the ones who expect 
handouts. We want Asia on our side and expect it to conform to our way of thinking” 
(171). If Harris had a retort, Rama Rau does not record it, leaving the impression in 
this instance, as she does across the whole of East of Home, that Harris is repeat-
edly silenced by both political and philosophical wisdom so persuasive that there 
is no possible response — at least not one that Harris has the capacity to imagine. 
Rama Rau thus implies that in the face of rational argumentation offered by either 
“authentic” natives or a “professional” expert such as Bowers, Americans like Har-
ris are quite literally dumbstruck. Harris emerges as a caricature, and a narratively 
effective one at that. She also functions as Rama Rau’s ventriloquist. She asks the 
kinds of questions that Rama Rau, given her investment in displaying the tension 
between her attraction to the cause of Asia and her sympathy for (even identification 
with) American power, was interested in raising for her American readers in order 
to underscore the dilemmas and the unique contributions of the Cold War cosmo-
politan. In the meantime, Harris also comes to represent the very kind of expertise 
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to which Rama Rau offers herself as a counterpoint. While she may be sympathetic 
to American power, unlike Harris, she is not its representative in Asia, but rather an 
ex-centrically mobile cosmopolitan who has acquired expertise not simply by being 
Indian but by learning about Asia as an Indian from other Asians — and by claiming 
a degree of insight about America and Americans as well. And she offers this cosmo-
politan expertise apparently unthreateningly, in the guise of travel writing pitched 
at American consumers just as Asia was emerging as one of the major global flash 
points of the 1950s and 1960s.21
All of which leads us to ask: What exactly is on display in East of Home, to 
what political purposes, and with what ideological effects? “The East” itself as a 
series of tourist sites and as a pan-Asian whole is clearly one of the spectacles that 
the book produces — evidenced as much by the way the chapters carve out the local 
(“China,” “Indo-China,” “Siam,” “Indonesia” ) as by the map (“The route of Santha 
Rama Rau”), which literally centers Asia for the reader. On display, too, of course, is 
India’s place in the postwar order. It is of Asia but ahead of it; it is superior to it, not 
simply because of its “success” at independence but because of the capacity of peo-
ple like Rama Rau (and at a higher geopolitical level, Nehru) to act as translators of 
the world beyond the West and to navigate the new world order with old world civil-
ity.22 In addition to Rama Rau’s class position, her Brahmanical Indian background 
gave her a privileged status over the fallen British, the unsophisticated Americans, 
and the multitude of East Asians who peopled the postwar stage. Equally powerful 
is the gender politics that the figure of Harris — and by implication, Rama Rau her-
self — enacts for readers. Rama Rau emerges as the quintessential modern woman, 
circulating all over the globe as an independent single female and giving new mean-
ing to “the East as a career.” But in contrast to Harris — or at least, when Harris is 
present — she often does not speak, let alone speak her mind, allowing Harris to 
draw the fire and Bowers to pronounce the definitive political statements. Moving 
east of home renders Rama Rau less certain of herself than when she went home to 
India. And, I would argue, although she is no less disposed toward a certain form 
of orientalism than in her first book, the promontory perspective that characterized 
the previous story is now attributed to Harris, while Rama Rau, equally aloof but 
less articulate about it, ends up in a position of ambivalence. Rama Rau is still a self-
avowed cosmopolitan, and an expert one at that, but she is also one whose inherited 
confidence in the possibility of its disinterestedness is more precarious than when 
she began. This unstable position, with its embrace of the pedagogical power of 
cosmopolitanism and its residual dis-ease with the status of the expert, was perhaps 
one of the only ones available to a diasporic Indian woman in America, a woman 
who was subject to an orientalizing gaze herself simply by virtue of being an Indian 
woman in public. Her ambivalence about the possibilities of a triumphalist, heroic 
model of cosmopolitanism operates, significantly, as an interesting contrast to what 
was on display at Bandung itself, where Nehru and Chou En-lai especially per-
formed decidedly masculinist models of postcolonial cosmopolitanism in the con-
text of fading British imperial power and the realities of the new American-Soviet 
superpower system.23
As East of Home moves to its conclusion, Rama Rau becomes more critical 
of the West but less inclined to include the United States in that designation; she 
is simultaneously less identified with India and more comfortable with her new-
found Asian identity. In many respects she anticipates what Neloufer de Mel has 
called “lateral cosmopolitanism” to refer to the extranational spirit among women 
and feminist organizations in South Asia in the earlier twentieth century, with lat-
eral signifying a gaze that moves across the subcontinent rather than simply toward 
the West.24 To be sure, there are moments when Rama Rau is actively critical of the 
United States in Japan, especially with respect to the war trials, which she deemed 
“one of the most expensive and futile projects the Occupation had embarked on.”25 
And she is chastened by both Harris’s brazen Americanness and the challenges to 
American neo-imperialism that women like Hani and Nomura pose to her. The 
book ends with Rama Rau recording Bowers’s rant: Americans are extremely igno-
rant of Asia, they know no Asian languages — a fatal attitude, in his view, while 
“the world . . . is growing bigger every day.”26 And yet the implication is that such 
knowledges — of eastern languages, arts, politics, people — are necessary for, and 
instrumental to, the success of the United States’ new role in the decolonized and 
decolonizing world. Bowers may not have been an apologist for the regime, but as 
an employee of the occupation and the personal aide to no one less than General 
MacArthur himself, he was not a critic either. A linguistic expert of the kind that 
would end up imagining, creating, and defending the project of area studies in U.S. 
universities in the late 1940s and after, he was “perilously close to those sensitive 
American specialists unleashed to ‘uplift’ the post-war world.”27
The same may be said of Santha Rama Rau, for whom Bowers’s earnest, 
benevolent, and utterly unself-critical embrace of things “eastern” stands as the 
model political position at the end of the book: one that she implicitly valorizes 
and even mimics. In this sense, the political education she stages in East of Home 
is a reorientation on several levels: from India to Asia via America, from tourist to 
emergent expert via Harris and Bowers — two very different models of expertise she 
implicitly rejects in order to fashion her own. On their last stop in Jakarta, while 
taking photographs of the ruination left in the wake of the Dutch colonial regime, 
her group is hailed by a soldier. “Are you for the Republic” he calls out. “ ‘Oh yes,’ 
we shouted back decidedly,” is the reply. This would-be populism is tempered by 
the advantages her elite status affords her — “Before we left . . . we had dinner with 
President Sukarno and his wife. It was like being at home again” — but the message 
is clear: Rama Rau has embraced the spirit of pan-Asian solidarity as her parents 
did that of Indian nationalism as against the old-order, European colonialism.28 We 
might reasonably conclude that what Rama Rau does by the end of East of Home is 
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to domesticate the unbridled and uncritical cosmopolitanism of Home to India, so 
that travel east of home produces a political reorientation from one colonial power 
(the postimperial British) to another (the neo-imperial United States) and a new 
register for domesticity (feeling “at home” with the new Asian nationalisms) as well. 
Rama Rau does so by accommodating pan-Asian sympathies without countenancing 
the full, and one must say radical, implications of such an ideology for the new world 
order. In this sense, and importantly, hers is not the same kind of pan-Asianism 
articulated by Nomura; that incarnation is unavailable to her as an extranational 
figure, someone in basic sympathy with the postwar American global project.29
To some degree, the semi-imperial role accorded to India (vis-à-vis Japan 
and, with it, East Asia more generally) in Santha Rama Rau’s writing in the decade 
before Bandung is derivative of the Nehruvian vision of Indian nationalism to 
which her parents’ generation subscribed. The pan-Asian dimension of that vision 
stemmed at least from the 1920s, when C. R. Das had suggested the formation of 
an Asiatic Federation and Nehru himself had encountered Chinese delegates at the 
1927 Brussels Congress sponsored by the League against Imperialism.30 Influenced 
by such events, Nehru had emphasized India’s centrality in Asia at least beginning 
with the publication of his Glimpses of World History in 1929. Here he mapped the 
subcontinent’s geographical location as a rationale for India’s indispensability to the 
much-anticipated postimperial world order and, after 1947, used that same rationale 
for constructing the very bases of nonalignment. “Whichever problem in Asia you 
take up, somehow or other India comes into the picture,” he wrote in a speech to the 
Indian Council of World Affairs in 1949. “Whether you think in terms of China, or 
the Middle East or South East Asia, India immediately comes into the picture.”31 If 
the boundaries of Asia proved quite capacious, India’s role was no less critical. For 
while Nehru decried the possibility that India should or would become the leader of 
Asia, he nonetheless insisted that India had a responsibility for “taking the initiative 
sometimes and helping others cooperate.”32 This attitude was enshrined in the plan-
ning for and the execution of the first (and last) Asian Relations Conference in Delhi 
in 1947, where Nehru’s emphatic claim that he (and India) was not seeking the lead-
ership of Asia was met with some skepticism.33 At the moment, we await a compre-
hensive cultural reading of Nehru’s pan-Asianism and its meanings for postcolonial 
India more generally; we also lack as full an understanding as we need of the range 
of postcolonial Indian nationalists’ responses to the challenges posed by participa-
tion in a newly global yet highly regionalized new postwar order. In the meantime, 
Rama Rau’s travelogue offers us an elaborate example of the cultural politics of 
pan-Asianism during this postimperial, neo-imperial moment, even as it registers 
both the gendered subtexts and the contradictions of Cold War cosmopolitanism 
for a non-Western elite in the generation during and after Nehru. Given the ways 
in which that elite helped to shape both Indian foreign policy from Delhi and the 
image of India abroad from New York (especially through K. P. S. Menon and Neh-
ru’s sister, Vijaylakshmi Pandit, both representatives for India at the United Nations 
in this period), their cosmopolitan presumptions — and the semi-imperial ideolo-
gies and practices they in turn generated — cannot easily be dismissed if we are to 
historicize the ideological work of geopolitical culture in the age of Bandung.
Nor was Asia the only object of an emergent semi-imperial gaze as it oper-
ated in Rama Rau’s writing in the years leading up to Bandung. She wrote two 
pieces on Kenya, one for the New York Times Magazine in 1953 and one in 1954 
for the Reporter, a now defunct New York city magazine, which brought African 
nationalism into view as an example of contemporary challenges to colonial rule and 
as a cautionary tale for American readers with respect to the “problem” of race. As 
she had in East of Home, Rama Rau cast herself as a sympathetic observer in Kenya, 
parsing the triangulated landscape of race relations in Nairobi (white, black, brown) 
and, arguably, offering a more multifaceted view of African nationalism (as embod-
ied both by the Mau Mau and Jomo Kenyatta) than American readers were likely to 
get from either British or American correspondents. Rama Rau spoke with candor 
about the racism of white settler colonialism in East Africa and the limits, practi-
cal and political, of a “terrorist” movement like the Mau Mau. So, for example, her 
New York Times Magazine piece emphasized the insularity and presumptive racism 
of “the pink gin set” in Nairobi, underscoring whites’ contempt for Africans and 
the cultural bankruptcy of white settler racism. She painted a vivid, detailed, and 
(as she had with Clare Harris in China) deliberately caricatured picture of a white 
supremacist state that was militarized not only officially but privately as well — with 
European dinner parties routinely ending with a revolver roll call — “you’re armed, 
of course?” — before the guests headed home for the evening.34 While she recog-
nized that white racism and the “social insults” it daily entailed must be “deeply 
wounding to the Africans,” Rama Rau’s sympathies, however, were not with the 
insurgents. Her Reporter piece, occasioned by her trip to Africa during Kenyatta’s 
trial, produced an ethnography of the Mau Mau that focused on the “terrifying” 
and often coerced oath-taking rituals by which Kikuyu were initiated into the orga-
nization and reflected an unflattering, partial picture of African nationalism to an 
American readership increasingly (if belatedly) alive to the growing “race relations” 
problem in its own midst.35
The Mau Mau was first reported in the New York Times in the fall of 1952, 
and it was labeled a terrorist organization from the outset. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
coverage focused exclusively on its violent deeds and especially on attacks against 
white settlers, though the Mau Mau also went after Africans as well.36 Slaughter, 
devastation, and primitive were standard headline terms for characterizing the 
Mau Mau — terms often taken directly from quotes by British officials or European 
settlers.37 Opinion on the Mau Mau was divided in African American communities, 
where the violent tactics generated tremendous debate and controversy, as the work 
of James Merriweather has shown.38 In this context, Rama Rau’s piece for the New 
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York Times Magazine in the summer of 1953 looks decidedly moderate (as does 
the Mau Mau itself, given recent historiographical revisions about the savagery of 
the final decade of British rule in Kenya).39 And yet in the context of Third World 
politics on the threshold of Bandung, hers was a position of partial solidarity at 
best. I want to suggest that Rama Rau could take up this apparently balanced yet 
ultimately antinationalist view precisely because of her claims to a certain postcolo-
nial identity, one dependent on a very particularly Indian relationship to both Brit-
ish imperialism and American global interests in the years immediately preceding 
Bandung. To be sure, Rama Rau’s account detailed British magistrates’ de-oathing 
ceremonies, pointing out that they employed the same “barbaric” practices (touch-
ing the mucus of the sheep’s eye to the lips, for example) as the Mau Mau did. This 
led her in turn to wonder how challenging it must be “for the ordinary Kikuyu to 
decide just where the foreigners stand on the question of witchcraft.”40 She was not, 
in other words, unaware of or unwilling to make visible the impossibility of British 
claims to superiority on the ground, in practice, in Africa. But the Mau Mau in gen-
eral, and Kenyatta in particular, come off as questionable if not illegitimate claim-
ants to independence and postcolonial status because of the resort to violence that 
she then reads as the signature of African nationalism. Rama Rau, too, emphasized 
the Mau Mau’s deadly tactics — “terrorism, murder of human beings, slaughter of 
livestock and, possibly, . . . a scorch-earth policy” — and she offered no larger view of 
either Kenyatta’s political history or that of the Kenya African Union, leaving read-
ers to draw their own conclusions about how they fit into the longer, pan-African 
histories of African nationalism.41 The almost complete lack of attention to historical 
context and to evidence from across the continent constitutes a marked break from 
her writings about Asia, which had been characterized by attention to local histories 
of contact and, as we have seen, a transnational Asian panorama. These twin strate-
gies had enabled a nuance that, for all its orientalism, worked to undermine some 
familiar stereotypes in the service of a larger pedagogical purpose: that is, to enun-
ciate her own political conversion to a decidedly postcolonial pan-Asianism, albeit a 
promontory one. In her Africa essays, Rama Rau’s perspective is no less elevated, yet 
it seeks no company with the objects in view, and it telescopes Kenya in ways that 
make it seem representative of Africa and African nationalisms as a whole. There 
is, in short, no bildungsroman here; thanks to the critical success of both Home to 
India and East of Home, Santha Rama Rau was already well established as the post-
colonial expert. Her Asian narrative of development cannot, and does not, take root 
in the African reportage. Whereas it appeared, in the adroit prose of East of Home, 
to grow logically from the similarities and historical points of contact that Rama 
Rau apprehended while on her travels, it founders here on the ground of African 
difference. Readers of Rama Rau’s oeuvre — and she was well reviewed in a host of 
regional and local newspapers across the United States — might well have perceived 
that difference in racial terms, not least because in telling contrast with her two 
African essays, race is not a word she used much, if at all, in describing her travels 
and encounters in Asia, though, as Gerald Horne’s work has shown, in the Pacific 
theater, it had been very much a “race war” at the level of official policy for both the 
Allies and the Japanese.42
Two newspaper articles are, to be fair, not exactly comparable with two full-
length books. And yet no account of Rama Rau’s career as a Cold War cosmopol-
itan — of her career as postcolonial expert — would be complete without attention 
to them, not least because her unmarked position as an expatriate Indian national 
structures the kinds of Cold War cosmopolitanism and postcolonial expertise she 
projected in this context. Although she never references them expressly, I want to 
suggest that Nehru and the Indian National Congress are a shadow presence, hov-
ering over both of Rama Rau’s essays on the Mau Mau and evocative of the ways 
that Brent Edwards has suggested W. E. B. Du Bois functions as “the shadow of 
shadows” in the career of Ho Chi Minh.43 Kenyatta’s career in Britain, and espe-
cially his circulation through metropolitan spaces in Europe and in Moscow, makes 
him, potentially at least, a candidate for the cosmopolitan nationalism of which both 
Nehru and, to a lesser degree, Rama Rau herself had become the embodiment by 
the 1950s. Rather than serving as the explanatory framework for his later political 
convictions, Kenyatta’s career path seemed “baffling” to Rama Rau, beginning with 
the fact that he “doesn’t, for example, know when he was born” and continuing with 
his unconventional and largely self-made education (farm laborer, meter reader, 
Harold Laski student). In effect, Rama Rau cast doubt on the efficacy of East Afri-
can nationalism in part because of the unorthodox cosmopolitanism of its leader. 
Surely this is about differences of class, and about the ways in which discourses and 
material structures of racial difference are coded and circulate through colonial 
and here, a partially postcolonial, history. But it is equally, and interdependently, 
about hierarchies of racial and cultural difference within and among colonial pos-
sessions of the British Empire past and present in 1953 – 54 — hierarchies of black 
and brown with long histories in imperial discourse, despite what practices of coex-
istence, cooperation, and collaboration may have also occurred on the ground.44 
These hierarchies are very much on view in Rama Rau’s New York Times Magazine 
story, which features the following observation:
Outside the hotel, standing in the brilliant crystal sunlight of Kenya, on one 
of the city’s busiest streetcorners, there may be a group of Masai tribesmen 
barefoot, carrying their spears, dressed only in a dusty blanket slung over 
one shoulder and with their bodies and hair rubbed with red ochre. Possibly 
they may be in town to shop or perhaps to sightsee. A group of Indian school 
children wheel by on bicycles on their way home for lunch. Veiled Muslim 
women of Arab descent may be peering at the things displayed in shops 
windows — cloth from India, canned goods from England, dresses from South 
Africa.
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These three main population groups — the Europeans, the Asian and the 
African — live in the same city with a high degree of mutual exclusiveness or, 
as a friend described it, as a racial pousse café, each element necessary to the 
whole, each retaining its separate identity and, in the opinion at least of most 
Europeans and some Indians, a disastrous and unpalatable failure when the 
various elements mix.45
If only in terms of the way her gaze moves — and in turn, directs ours — in these 
paragraphs, the racialized presumptions of Rama Rau’s cosmopolitan vision are 
starkly realized. Not only are women of Arab descent absorbed into the category 
of “Asian,” they, along with Indian school children headed for a hot lunch at home, 
are ranged against barefoot Masai tribesmen who loiter — perhaps with a purpose, 
perhaps not. And the Indians and Europeans agree not just on the failure of racial 
mixture but on its unpalatability as well.46
We cannot say with certainty whether Rama Rau shared Kenyan Indians’ 
views on “racial mixture,” especially given the fact that by the time she wrote on 
the Mau Mau she had married Faubion Bowers. And again, it needs to be said 
that Rama Rau was not completely without appreciation for the plight of Africans 
or for Kenyatta himself, whose role in the Kenya African Union she at least recog-
nized. And yet, although she never names Nehru as a countermodel, she represents 
Kenyatta as such a desultory figure that it is hard not to read him as an implicit con-
trast with Nehru — whom Americans were coming to understand, if not exactly to 
like, as a cultured, intellectual, and, above all, anglophile postcolonial man. At the 
very least, her curt description of Kenyatta as “a stocky man with an ugly, powerful 
face” invites comparison with the way Nehru was treated in the American press: the 
combination of his nonalignment and his intellectualism made him a highly effemi-
nized figure in print culture and State Department correspondence alike.47 Rama 
Rau’s Kenyatta is unattractive but certainly not effeminate, and the contrast sets in 
motion a competitive politics of colonial/postcolonial masculinity that was threaded 
through hierarchies of race and class even as it helped to produce, by fixing, those 
categories themselves.48 Both Rama Rau’s New York Times Magazine essay and her 
article for the Reporter remained, moreover, almost completely devoid of women, 
in stark contrast to her Asian travelogues. The New York Times Magazine piece 
featured a series of photographs of white settler men in defiant poses; where African 
men appear, they are either dimly recognizable as “native backdrop” or literally 
as ancillary, as in the photo of several armed members of the African Auxiliary 
Patrol.49 The one exception to this is Rama Rau’s reference to the white mother who 
cannot leave her daughter alone in the garden for fear of her being snatched by Mau 
Mau agents.50 In the narratology of empire, both mother and daughter are classic 
white female victims, and there are no African Kumiko Nomuras to challenge this 
representation or to offer Rama Rau insider knowledge; indeed, there are no Afri-
can women at all. As significantly, the hero of the Reporter piece is not Kenyatta but 
his English lawyer, D. N. Pritt, whose cynical, opportunistic, and above all legalistic 
line about the trial —“it is more important to fight this case than to win it” — she 
uses as a dramatic end point to her narrative.51
Rama Rau recognized that Kenyatta’s trial did not mean the end of the Mau 
Mau but the beginning of “one of the most inflammatory chapters in history — the 
political and emotional self-assertion of the Africans in the eastern, central and 
southern countries of their immense continent.”52 If we ignored the word inflamma-
tory, it might be possible to read this as an anodyne statement, even an agnostic one, 
with respect to the “problem” of African nationalism. But given the tensions over 
racial hierarchies in Africa and the circumstances through which the postcolonial 
Indian state came to a public embrace of the project of African nationalism in both 
parliamentary debate and on the world stage, we do so at our peril. In the years 
between independence and Bandung, the Indian government’s interest in Africa was 
focused on, if not strictly limited to, the problem of Indian settlers in South Africa 
and East Africa.53 And although “Asia and Africa” were paired in Nehru’s rhetoric as 
part of his vision for the postwar world, it was always in that order. And it was clear 
pretty consistently from 1947 onward that it was Asia that was to take “responsibil-
ity” for “spreading freedom . . . out over the whole human race.”54 What is more, 
Nehru’s speech at the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947 articulated a 
patron-client relationship in which Africa was specifically imagined as the object 
of such Asian responsibility.55 Bandung indubitably ratcheted up the stakes, both 
symbolic and real, of Afro-Asian unity in the face of Western anxieties about the 
insurgent nationalisms of the Third World, though it did not necessarily interrupt 
the logic of clientism through which India saw Africa, at least until events in Algeria 
in 1956 and the Congo in 1960 (where, incidentally, India made an army brigade 
available to the United Nations in 1961) compelled a more explicit commitment to 
Afro-Asian brotherhood (47 – 53, 26 – 27, 69). The nature of this clientism (which was 
one structural manifestation of the concept of semi-imperialism I have been using 
to describe Rama Rau’s discursive maneuvers) is perforce complex. Nehru himself 
articulated a developmentalist logic of African nationalism through what he called 
in 1958 the growth of “the African personality” — a logic that was accompanied by 
all good wishes and exhortations to Indians to find solidarity with the new postco-
lonial regime in Ghana, for example (25). The conference of African students that 
Nehru had opened in Delhi in 1956 made for a more concrete expression of that 
commitment, even as it located the anticolonial training ground squarely in India. 
Nor should African agency be discounted here. As the testimonies of some delegates 
from Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda suggest, some Africans appreciated Nehru’s 
insistence on the link between Asian and African struggles, calling him “Nehruji” 
and recognizing in him the architect of “Afro-Asianism” (23, 55).
As James Ferguson reminds us, such articulations of African modernity 
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proved as vital and necessary as nationalism itself, even if they were expressed in 
part as clientism in a developmentalist register. At the same time, and as Nehru 
understood, postwar modernity meant “global status . . . [that is,] the condition of 
being first” — and of course, of being able to recognize and make globally visible 
those “others” who came behind.56 Given the geopolitical realities developing in 
the 1950s, then, Santha Rama Rau’s Kenyan pieces offer not just a prehistory to the 
solidarities set in motion by Bandung but they mark out many of the lines of tension 
as well — some imprinted with older British imperial legacies, others more freshly 
minted in light of new postcolonial realities, America’s postwar global aspirations 
among them. For one of Rama Rau’s accomplishments in her Reporter essay was to 
translate the Mau Mau into terms that Americans could appreciate. Near the start of 
her article on Kenyatta’s trial, she noted that the Europeans in the colony called the 
Mau Mau “ ‘the African Stern Gang’ or sometimes a ‘Ku Klux Klan in reverse.’ ”57 
The Stern Gang (technically, Lehi, a Hebrew acronym for Lohamei Herut Israel, 
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) was a Jewish paramilitary group at work prior 
to the founding of the state of Israel; the Klan, for its part, was garnering increased 
publicity in the postwar period as it saw opportunities to both fuel and capitalize on 
antiblack violence in the American South.58 The juxtaposition of these two terms, 
and the comparisons they evoke, speaks directly to the ambivalence Rama Rau reg-
istered about what she saw in Africa in the early 1950s, and to the position she was 
cultivating as a postcolonial expert for an American audience. On the one hand, the 
Stern Gang was an anti-British, if not wholly anticolonial, organization that attacked 
mainly British targets. On the other hand, there was nothing redemptive about 
the Klan, and at the end of the day, both of these analogies were drawn directly 
from white settler usage in ways that, whether by design or effect, offered Ameri-
can readers an imperial vantage point refracted through two inflammatory sites in 
contemporary U.S. policy and culture. As in East of Home, Rama Rau delivered an 
“Indian” postcolonial perspective that underscored her own cosmopolitan identity 
(world traveler, world commentator) but did so via an appreciation for American 
neo-imperial sensibilities. In the case of the Mau Mau and the Klan metaphor, she 
broached at least the possibility that America’s race relations might be viewed as a 
problem of domestic colonial management and containment. Given that New York 
Times coverage used the word Negro to describe Africans in the context of the Mau 
Mau, that leap of interpretation would not have been so very great for readers.59
Such an interpretive possibility has, moreover, important resonances with 
recent work on the links between Cold War ideologies and civil rights activity,60 not 
least because it adds a layer of transnational complexity often alluded to in those new 
histories but rarely fully explored: that this, the role of India and Indians in shap-
ing the cultural and ideological terms through which the United States struggles to 
become, and to imagine itself as, the post-British imperial world power after 1945. 
Frenise Logan’s work on racism and Indian-U.S. relations is now almost twenty years 
old, but it deserves revisiting for the arguments she makes about how and why Indi-
ans in India articulated their views about American racial policy toward “Negroes” 
in the almost ten years leading up to Bandung. What she tracks is a resistance in the 
Indian press to American claims to fitness for world leadership given the persistence 
of Jim Crow in the U.S. South.61 Such sentiment is the very kind that made the State 
Department anxious about nonalignment in general and Bandung in particular. It 
is also quite a different angle of vision than Santha Rama Rau’s. Works like Logan’s 
can and should be used as the basis for new histories about how and under what 
conditions Indians of all classes, castes, and political/geographical locations have 
embedded histories of British colonialism in, and articulated global power through, 
reference to contemporary U.S. politics — and how and under what conditions they 
did not, since of course South Asian history should not be completely absorbed 
into either American imperial history or, for that matter, into a paradigmatically 
“Bandung and after” history either. In any case, Rama Rau’s career does offer us a 
concrete example of how India and Indians have facilitated American identification 
with and disavowal of British imperial hegemony, as well as how flexible cosmopoli-
tanism and its agents have been in their encounters with modernity, postcoloniality, 
and history itself.
Santha Rama Rau offers, in sum, a particularly vivid example of how “discrep-
ant subjects of globalization” can and often do function as cosmopolitan ones — par-
ticularly, as Caren Kaplan has observed, when they are women emerging in post- and 
neocolonial moments.62 Given the extent to which “practices of othering internal to 
the East” are a commonplace of state imaginings and national image management 
in the modern world outside the West, the orientalism at the heart of Rama Rau’s 
cosmopolitan self-fashioning may not be as unusual as we might expect.63 When 
the correlative histories of Afro-Asian connection have been more fully engaged, 
her apprehensions of Africa and through it, her interpolation of African Americans, 
may not prove any more remarkable. The stakes of historicizing these questions 
are unquestionably high. For, as Malini Johar Schueller has suggested, the simul-
taneous invocation and erasure of blackness, and of race more generally, remains a 
remarkably underexamined feature of postcolonial studies, particularly in the strain 
produced by diasporic South Asians.64 This is only one aspect of the “neo-orientalist 
underpinnings of postcolonial theory in the west” that critics like Schueller and 
Elleke Boehmer are invested in materializing and historicizing via the figures of 
women and through the conjoined optics of critical race and gender theory.65 To 
the extent that rhetorics of postcolonialism are rooted in and aim to shape political 
practices in an age of aggressive American imperialism (not to mention runaway 
“globalization”), specifying the historical genealogies of these interdependent racial 
histories is an urgent task.66 As I have tried to show here, Rama Rau is a highly par-
ticular but nonetheless heuristically productive example of the shifting grounds of 
cosmopolitanism in the newly postcolonial world, and of the uneven development 
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of cultural and racial solidarity in the age of Bandung. Indeed, Rama Rau may be 
said to have linked postcolonial realities and Cold War concerns in a register that 
few contemporaries were able to do, making lateral connections that are, even now, 
just being appreciated by historians of the twentieth century. Tracking Rama Rau’s 
claims to postcolonial cosmopolitanism as they were articulated through images of 
and events in Asia and Africa allows us to appreciate her as a minor, if culturally 
provocative, player in the lead up to Bandung; to see glimpses of Cold War America 
as a nursery for neo-imperial ambition; and to understand the ongoing role of India 
in shaping a genuinely, and above all critically, transnational postcolonial history of 
the present as well.
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